biosecurity

my rant on my work (yes, 6 weeks in, i can already rant):

the integral problem with biosecurity is that it's so vague and slow. worrying about biological warfare and bioterrorism isn't stupid -- it's smart. anthrax mailings and sarin gas attacks have already occurred; the likelihood that some other pathogen is gonna be released into areas of dense population is probably pretty high. if i were a terrorist, it'd be pretty freakin' smart to release an air-borne or food-borne bioagent. not only would it become a systemic problem (not localized), but it would spread quickly. and be difficult to contain. so why not?

scary, huh?

but as much as there is to worry about, the preventative measures that we can take are... lacking. there are sooo many (like really, hundreds) of agents and pathogens and molecules and diseases that are deadly and dangerous. some are even naturally-occurring, like avian flu and SARS and AIDS and West Nile. hello, those infectious diseases may wipe out the earth without any offensive work at all. imagine what happens where they're purposefully spread. and then, there's not-as-natural stuff, like anthrax and botulinum and smallpox. and the worst? the worst are novel agents -- newly engineered pathogens that can be created, due to our wondrous innovations in biological research that allow us to splice genes and re-insert pieces and make other sections more potent. these new ones -- how can we protect ourselves against things we have no idea of?? we can only react, and react we will... but slowly. reaction against a biological attack will take time -- time to detect it and locate the source, time to identify the molecule, time to characterize it, time to recognize its symptoms, time to determine an approach for treatment and therapy, time to track it, and time to spread the word. that's just too much time.

so we'll presently focus on the ones we DO know about. again however, there are so many -- how does one (and who) decide which ones to create a vaccine against? are there general, overall, sweeping preventative measures?? not really. and biological threats are different than nuclear threats; with nuclear, you have to have the plutonium or the uranium -- you need the materials. with bio, they're pretty much everywhere, consistently available.

great. i feel so safe.

and the other persistent, non-resolved issue is the idea of dual-use. dual-use has been around forever.. but the concerns are reaching a squealing high right now. BSL-3 and BSL-4 (biosafety level) labs are popping up, here and there and everywhere, from the CDC in atlanta to the university of texas to bu and in fort detrick at USAMRIID. these labs are the ones that deal with ebola and marburg, places where researchers quarantine themselves in. BSL-2 (and even BSL-1?) labs play with bacteria -- but even certain strains of E.coli can result in death. so what happens if a researcher accidentally (or not) walks out the lab with the bug? or if the lab tech is evil and steals the protocol on how to proliferate the stuff? who do you allow to work in a lab? who says that native-born americans are any safer than foreign nationals who don't speak perfect english? how much background inspection must one go through.. and what qualifies as "satisfactory"? aiya! what research projects must be stopped -- because they're "dual-use," research that can be applied for good... but for bad as well? science is innovation and communication; are we to halt that in the name of safety? caution? paranoia??

there are a bazillion new offices, departments, directorates, advisory boards, non-profits, and "centers" dedicated to investigating and analyzing this stuff. but where do you even start? how? what do we do with the mounds of money (billions, really. billions) appropriated for these programs??

sigh. i'm working for "peace". haha, it's so.... un-tangible.